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Reaganomics: 
Success and Failure 
by Murray L. Weidenbaum 
After two-and-a-half years, the time 
seems appropriate to evaluate the Reagan 
economic program. I will do just that, indi-
cating failures as well as successes. In the 
process, I am likely to disappoint liberals 
and conservatives alike, but I will try to 
provide as careful and balanced an 
appraisal as I can. 
Let me begin the analysis with the fun-
damentals of Reaganomics announced by 
the White House in February 1981, in what 
we called the economic White Paper. In that 
key policy document, we stated that the 
basic objective of Reaganomics is to shift 
the balance of power from the Federal 
government to the rest of society. This 
important shift was to be accomplished by 
a four-pronged approach: (1) cutting tax 
rates, (2) slowing down the growth of 
Federal spending, (3) curtailing the burden 
of regulation, and (4) reducing the growth 
of the money supply. 
The hoped-for results were to be rapid 
and sustained economic growth coupled 
with declining inflation. Well, what has 
occurred in the way of translating the 
rhetoric into reality? What have been the 
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effects on the American economy? As we 
will see, actions have been taken in each of 
the four areas, but the results have been 
very uneven. As a professor, I will grade the 
Reagan economic program. But please be 
patient. As in class, the grades will come at 
the end. 
Tax Cuts 
On the revenue side, the President urged 
the Congress back in February 1981 to 
enact a 25 percent across-the-board reduc-
tion in personal income tax rates over three 
years plus a major liberalization of 
business depreciation allowances. That was 
done. But, in the course of the legislative 
process, a "bidding" war occurred, which 
resulted in many costly items of special 
legislation being added to the tax bill. These 
included the temporary "all savers cer-
tificates" designed to aid the hard-pressed 
thrift institutions. More fundamental and 
expensive were the added structural 
changes such as indexing the personal 
income tax system. That is scheduled to 
begin in 1985. Other add-ons include sav-
ings incentives and reducing the so-called 
marriage tax penalty. 
In the course of the legislative process, a 
"bidding" war occurred, which resulted i11 
111a11y costly items of special legislation 
bei11g added to the 1981 tax bill 
Hindsight tells us that the Administration 
might have been better off if it had agreed 
to the early compromise suggested by key 
Congressional leaders. These members of 
Congress wanted to make the third install-
ment of the tax cut contingent on progress 
in reducing the deficit. That would have 
obviated the "bidding war," which resulted 
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in various new tax "loopholes" being 
opened up. Also, the compromise would 
have eliminated the special spending 
increases-such as the sugar sub-
sidy-which were required to attain suffi-
cient support for the tax bill from dissident 
Democrats (the so-called "bollweevils"). 
In any event, as a result of the tax cuts, 
the Treasury's share of the national income 
has been declining-from 21 percent in 
1981 to 19 percent in 1983. The modest 
increase in selected taxes last year (the infa-
mous "revenue enhancements") slowed 
down this trend but did not reverse it. That 
downward shift stands in marked contrast 
to the 1970s, which witnessed a rise in the 
per capita federal tax burden. A two-
percent drop in the federal share of the 
national income may not sound like much, 
but let us remember that two percent of a 
$4 trillion economy is $80 billion a year. 
That could generate a substantial contribu-
tion to the national pool of private savings 
to finance economic growth. 
But that is not how these developments 
were viewed in financial markets. There, 
the large tax cuts were interpreted as mean-
ing an extended period of deficit financing. 
An extremely optimistic official economic 
forecast-what came to be known as "Rosy 
Scenario" -aggravated the situation. Finan-
cial markets responded with a significant 
rise in interest rates which directly 
increased interest on the national debt and, 
hence, the budget deficit. The rise in inter-
est rates also weakened the capital-
intensive sectors of the economy. That 
decline in business activity also contributed 
to higher deficits in the budget. 
In one particular respect, the economic 
fates have not been kind to Reaganomics. 
Reducing marginal tax rates and lowering 
the inflation rate have not so far generated 
the expected rise in the saving ratio. 
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Rather, personal saving has been a declin-
ing percentage of personal income. 
Spending Cuts 
But what about all the spending cuts? On 
the surface, the growth in federal spending 
has slowed down, but only in what econ-
omists call nominal terms. Government 
spending has increased rapidly in real 
terms-that is, when we boil out the effects 
of inflation. Important shifts in prior-
ities-that is, among specific budget 
categories-were made. These shifts were 
mainly from welfare to warfare. Never-
theless, government spending is a larger 
factor in the American economy today than 
it was in January 1981. 
I know that this finding may come as a 
surprise to those who read so much about 
all those budget cuts. During my first year 
in the Reagan Administration, I used to 
describe the budget restraint effort with an 
old budget office motto, "Good budgeting is 
the uniform distribution of dissatisfaction." 
I stopped saying that because only a few of 
the spending agencies-and their allies-
are greatly dissatisfied. 
To be sure, tens of billions of dollars of 
reductions have occurred in proposed 
Federal expenditures. Yet those unprec-
edented cuts (mainly reductions in pro-
posed increases) have been made entirely in 
a few civilian areas, such as grants to state 
and local governments and selected social 
welfare programs. But those decreases 
were more than offset by simultaneous 
rapid expansions in military outlays, farm 
subsidies, and interest payments, and by 
the continuing and almost inexorable rise in 
so-called "entitlement" outlays. 
The initial budget report of the new 
Administration (issued in March 1981) had a 
line for "unspecified savings," supposedly a 
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large amount of budget cuts presumably to 
be specified at a future date. What ensued 
reminds me of the words of the old song, 
"Tomorrow, I'll be leaving, but tomorrow 
never comes." Overall, federal spending has 
been rising, from 23 percent of GNP in 
fiscal 1981 to 25 percent in fiscal 1983. 
What these numbers mean is that taxes 
were cut substantially more than originally 
planned and expenditures far, far less-and 
not cut at all in real terms. The result is 
now large and growing budget deficits. 
I suggest that these undesirable results 
are not an inherent failing of the basic 
policy of Reaganomics. After all, the White 
Paper called for both large tax cuts and 
large budget reductions. But the short-
coming in execution turned out to be 
critical. The resultant large budget deficits 
represent an unresolved contradiction in 
the conduct of Reaganomics. 
The large budget deficits are 110t a11 inhere11t 
faili11g of the basic policy of Reaganomics, 
but rather represent a11 tmresolved 
contradiction in the co11duct of 
Reaganomics 
The annual flow of red ink has risen from 
$62 billion in fiscal 1981 to $110 billion in 
fiscal 1982 and to the neighborhood of $200 
billion-a very rough neighborhood-in 
fiscal 1983. Similar flows of red ink are 
anticipated in 1984 and 1985. Financing 
such large deficits during a period of 
expansion will mean competing with private 
investment for the limited supply of saving. 
The White House has blamed the Con-
gress for not reducing the swollen budget, 
while members of Congress respond that 
the President has submitted the deficit 
budgets in the first place. The fact of the 
matter is that both the President and the 
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Congress have been shy when it comes to 
real budget cutting. Because of the inability 
to cut spending in the face of rising deficits, 
it has become fashionable in Washington to 
debate whether deficits matter and whether 
tax increases do more harm than budget 
deficits. If the powers that be would make 
the tough decisions required to curb 
government spending, Administration 
spokesmen would not have to dance around 
the fundamental budget quandary in that 
fashion. 
Regulatory Reform 
Let us turn to the third pillar of 
Reaganomics-reducing the burden of 
government regulation. The major accom-
plishment in the regulatory reform area has 
been undramatic, but significant. For the 
first time in decades, no new major 
regulatory activities have been started. In 
fact, many burdensome regulations have 
been modified or rescinded as the result of 
instituting a comprehensive program of 
regulatory review, including the require-
ment for performing benefit/cost analysis of 
proposed regulations. Savings from these 
regulatory relief efforts are approximately 
$10 billion a year in current operating 
expenses plus a one-time saving of another 
$10 billion in capital outlays. 
Unfortunately, progress on regulatory 
reform has slowed very substantially in 
recent months. The largest regulatory body, 
the Environmental Protection Agency, has 
gone through a period of turmoil in the 
course of which many key officials 
resigned. The new head of the agency has 
cautioned that the present is not an appro-
priate time to seek basic changes in 
regulatory statutes. Moreover, the actions 
and statements of former Secretary of the 
Interior James Watt aroused many 
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segments of the environmental movement 
which previously had avoided engaging in 
partisan political controversy. 
In any event, in August 1983 the Vice 
President announced the termination of the 
Task Force on Regulatory Relief, which he 
had headed since the early days of the 
Administration. The Task Force was estab-
lished to provided leadership for the 
Reagan Administration's regulatory reform 
efforts. It set in motion the initial and 
useful regulatory review efforts. 
Simultaneously, in another key area of 
government involvement in business deci-
sion making, several serious backward 
steps have been taken since January 1981. I 
am referring to new restrictions of foreign 
trade. Many of these actions have reduced 
imports, but some have curtailed our ex-
ports. These contradictory actions have 
ranged from cajoling the Japanese to 
impose limits on their exports of 
automobiles to the U.S., to direct limits on 
imports of steel and meat, to preventing 
U.S. firms from participating in building 
the natural gas pipeline between Western 
Europe and the Soviet Union. 
The Admi11istration's trade policy has its 
shortcomi11gs, but they are overwhelmed by 
the Col'lgress' willi11g11ess to pa11der to 
virtually every protectim1ist i11terest 
Pressures for further restrictions on 
imports are very strong. A current example 
is the Congressional proposal to rigidly 
limit Japanese automobile imports via 
detailed "domestic content" rules. At first 
blush, that may sound fair-until you stop 
and think about it. How many jet airplanes 
would we export if each consumer nation 
required that a major portion of every 
airliner it bought had to be produced 
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domestically? Clearly, the Administration's 
trade policy has its shortcomings, but they 
are overwhelmed by the Congress' willing-
ness to pander to virtually every protec-
tionist interest. 
On balance, I cannot really say that, as a 
result of policy actions since January 1981, 
the federal government will be intervening 
less in the American economy than in the 
1970s. At best, we can describe crosscur-
rents, in terms of shifts since January 1981 
in the composition of government interven-
tion. If you sense a note of disappointment 
in these words, that is not accidental. 
Slower Monetary Growth 
With regard to monetary policy-the 
fourth part of the Reagan program-the 
Administration strongly supported the 
Federal Reserve System's efforts in 1981 
and 1982 to bring down inflation by reduc-
ing the growth in the money supply. The 
Fed accomplished that objective and, thus, 
also deserves the credit for the decline in 
nominal or market interest rates. Surely the 
large budget deficits have not helped. The 
Fed should get all the credit for bringing 
down inflation-but also for bringing down 
employment! We must acknowledge, of 
course, that progress on inflation was 
accompanied by a substantial rise in 
unemployment. The most optimistic projec-
tions show the unemployment rate in 
January 1985 to be higher than it was in 
January 1981. 
On the positive side, inflation is down 
from double digits to about 4-5 percent and 
is likely to stay there for a while. There is 
also a new sense of realism in economic 
decision making in the United States today. 
Ill-conceived company investments and 
expense commitments are no longer 
automatically bailed out by inflation. At the 
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consumer level, purchases of art and gold 
and postage stamps once again are looked 
upon as consumption activities, rather than 
primarily investments in what had been a 
continually rising price level. 
Employees are learning that their wages, 
salaries, and fringe benefits are vitally 
dependent on the future success of their 
companies. Although not universally, and 
always grudgingly, workers are increasingly 
willing to accept changes in work rules and 
job practices necessary to ensure their com-
pany's future. But the new sense of realism 
is quite recent. It could readily be reversed 
if the Federal Government decides to bail 
out declining industries, whether through 
an "industrial policy" or through protec-
tionism. 
An Appraisal of Reaganomics 
Let me now turn to an appraisal of 
Reaganomics. I remind my listeners of a 
point that I made repeatedly in 1981 and 
1982, when I was in office. I do not equate 
Reaganomics with supply-side economics 
and certainly not with the simple-minded 
view that tax rate cuts will reduce budget 
deficits. Rathel-, the Reagan economic pro-
gram is a blend of contributions from 
several contemporary schools of conser-
vative thought. 
!11 rea/terms, the estimates for Preside11t 
Carter's swm1so11g budget are lower tha11 the 
estimates co11tai11ed i11 the Reaga11 
Admi11istratio11's most rece11t budget report 
The tax cuts-focusing on the need to 
reduce those punishingly high marginal 
rates-were, of course, based on the 
notions described as supply-side economics. 
Monetary policy, however, was expressed in 
terms of controlling the money supply, a 
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concept fundamental to monetarist thought. 
The budget cuts were conventional conser-
vative economics. Regulatory reform was 
an objective shared enthusiastically by all 
conservatives-and many others. 
Taking up each of the four pillars of 
Reaganomics, I find that the results to date 
constitute a mixed bag. Tax burdens are 
certainly lower than they would have been 
in the absence of the actions taken since 
January 1981. 
It is in the second area-spending reduc-
tions-that the Administration's accom-
plishments have fallen far short of expec-
tations. When we compare the projections 
of real spending for 1982-86 in President 
Carter's swansong budget with President 
Reagan's current numbers (also adjusted 
for inflation), we find that the Reagan 
spending numbers are higher than the 
Carter projections for the same 
period-and that the gap is widening. 
In the regulatory reform area, key 
changes that were anticipated have not 
occurred. Anticipated revisions of the 
extremely burdensome environmental 
statutes to make them more cost-effective 
/11 the regulatory area, the Admi11istratio11 
has taken several steps forward w1d perhaps 
the same number of steps backward 
were not even recommended to the Con-
gress by the Administration-in part 
because of anticipated Congressional 
resistance. Moreover, protectionist actions 
offset many of the genuine administrative 
improvements made to reduce the cost of 
complying with government rules. In the 
regulatory area, the Administration has 
taken several steps forward and perhaps 
the same number of steps backward. 
It is more difficult to evaluate the fourth 
pillar of Reaganomics, monetary restraint. 
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Surely, the initial policy of monetary 
restraint succeeded in bringing down infla-
tion. We must recall that inflation was the 
number one problem according to virtually 
every public opinion poll taken in the 
United States in 1980. During the past year, 
however, the Federal Reserve System has 
followed a more eclectic approach, one 
closer to its earlier tradition of concern 
with money market conditions and interest 
rates. Leading monetarists contend that the 
Fed is no longer following a monetarist 
approach, but rather that it has returned to 
Keynesian stop-and-go policy. Certainly, 
money supply movements since January 
1981 cannot be described as adhering to the 
guidelines in the Reagan Administration's 
economic White Paper of February 
1981-gradual and persistent reduction of 
the growth of the money supply. Moreover, 
with the President's reappointment of Paul 
Volcker as Chairman of the Fed, the Admin-
istration implicitly has endorsed the actions 
that he and his colleagues have taken. 
However, the White House apparently has 
resumed the practice of publicly needling 
the Fed, an activity that generally has been 
counterproductive. 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear 
that the costs of carrying out the Reagan 
economic program have been significantly 
greater than originally anticipated. Interest 
rates-especially real rates-are far higher 
than initially projected, and so is unemploy-
ment. Yet the progress on inflation has been 
greater than most observers expected and, 
at least for a while, the economy is on a 
growth trajectory once again. 
The international aspects of the Reagan 
Administration's domestic economic 
policies are troublesome. The basic prob-
lem has arisen as a result of the interaction 
in 1981-82 of tight monetary policy and 
easy fiscal policy. Unlike most previous 
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experiences, the budget deficits were not 
financed by monetizing them via infla-
tionary expansions in the money supply. 
Rather, the Treasury competed with private 
investment demands for the limited supply 
of saving, thus pushing up interest rates, 
particularly real interest rates. Although 
the movement was not exactly parallel, the 
value of the U.S. dollar in foreign exchange 
markets rose over this same period, reflect-
ing the increase in interest rates in the 
United States. 
All this forced many other nations to 
higher levels of interest rates, in order to 
stem capital flows to the United States. At 
times, that ran counter to the needs of their 
domestic policies, which called for stimulus 
to begin a process of recovery from reces-
sion. Particularly in the developing nations, 
the result of rising interest rates and a 
stronger dollar meant that it was more 
expensive to service their international 
indebtedness and that the burden of repay-
ment also was heavier. 
By no means should we attribute all 
economic problems to the American budget 
deficits. Nevertheless, the prospect of those 
outsized deficits becoming a durable fixture 
on the economic scene has set in motion a 
variety of adverse trends, in both the 
United States and elsewhere. The domestic 
costs to the United States have included a 
striking loss of competitiveness on the part 
of American products in relation to foreign 
goods. 
The powerful interactions between 
domestic and international developments 
are not truly appreciated by the American 
public. Nevertheless, they have generated 
some of the special costs that have arisen 
under an ambitious economic program 
attempting simultaneously to accelerate 
defense spending, cut taxes, and slow down 
inflation. 
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On reflection, that was a tall order, 
encouraging reliance on easy answers. All 
this provides some economic lessons for the 
future. Perhaps the overriding lesson is the 
need to make tough choices among 
desirable alternatives-in other words, to 
set priorities. For many people, supply-side 
economics was seen as the latest version of 
the promise of a free lunch. In any event, 
visions of rapidly rising revenues dampened 
for many the ardor to cut government 
spending. 
We must label as wishful thinking the 
notion that the way to cut govemme11t 
spendi11g is to cut taxes. The most effective 
way to cut spe11di11g is the more 
conventional route, to reduce appropriations 
Thus, a more specific economic lesson 
from the past three years is clear: We must 
label as wishful thinking the notion that the 
way to cut government spending is to cut 
taxes. In its extreme form, this idea had 
been expressed as the "only way to reduce 
spending is to reduce revenues." As many 
of us had suspected, and recent experience 
has confirmed, the most effective way to 
cut government spending is the more con-
ventional route, to reduce appropriations. 
Easier said than done-or many a slip be-
tween the cut and the lip. 
Conclusion 
On balance, how do I grade Reaganomics 
thus far? I must confess to a certain 
amount of ambivalence. I do, however, find 
the general thrust of Reaganomics as at-
tractive as ever. 
It is always pertinent to advocate reduc-
ing the tendency to look to the Federal 
Government to solve all of our societal ills. 
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The whole gamut of social welfare "enti-
tlements" needs to be controlled. High 
marginal tax rates need to be reduced. Our 
military establishment needs to be strength-
ened. The private sector needs to be 
elevated in terms of its role in society. 
Inflation needs to be kept under control. 
Yet, as we have seen, the specifics of the 
Reagan economic program are not entirely 
consistent with that litany of objectives. 
The present state of the economy is not 
devoid of serious problems. In fact, quite a 
few of them are more severe than they were 
in 1 anuary 1981. 
On balance, I find the most satisfactory 
way of appraising the Reagan economic 
program is in terms of the four pillars of 
the program. Thus, the high marginal 
income tax rates have been reduced. But 
that action did not generate the increases in 
private saving that it was designed to 
achieve. If the personal saving rate had 
risen-instead of falling-the huge deficits 
could have been financed with less upward 
pressure on interest rates. To tax policy, I 
give a B. 
A Report Card on Reaganomics 
Taxation 
Federal Spending 
Regulation 
Monetary Policy 
Overall 
B 
D 
c 
B+ 
C+ 
With reference to government spending, I 
find it hard to say that, on balance, any 
progress has been made. For the failure to 
cut government spending, I must award a 
grade of D. Thus, I am in effect giving fiscal 
policy an overall grade of C. Clearly, fiscal 
policy is the Achilles heel of Reaganomics. 
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The resultant large deficits have con-
tributed to the high interest rates that have 
bedeviled our domestic economy as well as 
international financial conditions. Budget 
cuts are still high on the agenda of unfin-
ished business. 
For regulatory reform, I grade the Admin-
istration C. It did not face the key statutory 
problems in the regulatory area. It under-
mined public confidence in environmental 
controls, and it-albeit reluctantly-em-
braced many protectionist measures. 
In the monetary area, I give the Admin-
istration a B +, mainly for supporting Paul 
Volcker's leadership, albeit with a bit of 
counterproductive public needling from 
time to time. 
If we have learned anything in the field of 
economic policy in the last three years, it is 
to be wary of simple solutions. I have no 
panaceas to offer, other than the strong 
belief that there are no pmtaceas 
What, then, is the overall grade for 
Reaganomics? According to my calcula-
tions, it is a disappointing C+. But, of 
course, this is in the nature of midterm 
grades which, it is always hoped, inspire 
the student to do much better in the 
remainder of the course. Moreover, some 
historical perspective is essential. The 
grade that I gave the preceding Administra-
tion was far lower. 
Let me offer a final point. If we have 
learned anything in the field of economic 
policy in the past three years, it is to be 
wary of simple solutions. Many difficult 
problems face modern societies. We can 
deal with those problems only by making 
hard choices. I have no panaceas to offer, 
other than the strong belief that there are 
no panaceas. The alternative is to embrace 
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yet another set of economic nostrums. For 
example, the continuing pressure for a 
return to the gold standard shows that the 
panacea approach to economic policy is 
alive and well. At the other end of the 
political spectrum, the burst of interest in 
"industrial policy" or reindustrialization is 
another example. It is simply the old, activ-
ist government wine (or vinegar) with 
another label, but not really of a different 
vintage. 
I see no alternative-in the public sec-
tor-to making the budget cuts that earn 
the tax cuts. In the private sector, the 
responsibility for increasing international 
competitiveness is on management and 
labor in each industry, who are responsible 
for increasing productivity and controlling 
costs. The long-run future of the American 
economy will be determined by our own 
ability to take tough actions in both the 
public and private sectors. That is the basic 
lesson that we should have learned since 
January 1981. 
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